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QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS
OF FLORIDA CASES
A brief summary of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Florida
rendered during the last quarter, is presented herein, in the belief that all of
the decisions of our highest court contribute greatly to the development of the
law, even if not sufficiently novel to justify, from an editorial standpoint,
extended comment. The decisions are divided into three classes: public law,
ptivate law, and adjectival law. Titles and subtitles are used to indicate the
arrangemient of material.
PUBLIc LAw
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw. Full faith and credit. The limitations on state
judicial power found in the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of
the United States, 2 were construed in two cases. Where a final decision has
been rendered in litigation between the same parties in another state, Florida
may not take jurisdiction to review or amend the decision. Where custody of
a child has been awarded to the father in divorce proceedings in another
jurisdicti6n, the courts of this state may take jurisdiction and make other
disposition of the custody of the child;3 but where a court has denied a
divorce in another state, the courts of Florida may not grant one for the same
cause. 4 It is understood that in both cases jurisdiction over the necessary
parties had been acquired in all courts: otherwise, the full faith and credit
clause would not apply.5 The distinction between the two cases lies in this,
that a custody decree is not, even where rendered, a final decree, but a decree
I. The decisions commented on are found from 36 So.2d 915 to 37 So.2d 927, covering
a period from October 12, 1948, to December 17, 1948. In addition, two decisions in-
advertently omitted from the last installment, p. 40, mrpra," are reported: State v. Beckham,
36 So.2d 769, and Gordon v. Gordon, 36 So.2d 774, decided September 21, 1948.
2. U.S. CONST., Art. IV, § 1.
3. Eddy v. Stauffer, 37 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1948). Under decree of divorce entered in
Cook County, Illinois, custody of a child was awarded to the father except for four weeks
out of each summer vacation. While the child was visiting the mother in Polk County,
Florida, in compliance with this decree, a new proceeding to determine the right of
custody was instituted. It was argued that the child was a ward of the Superior Court
of Cook County.
4. Gordon v. Gordon, 36 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1948). Wife instituted suit for divorce in
Pennsylvania, alleging indignities to the person, in January, 1946. The husband appeared
to contest in May, 1946. The wife moved to Miami Beach in June, 1946, and entered suit
for divorce in Florida in September, alleging extreme cruelty. The Pennsylvania court
denied a petition for leave to discontinue in May, 1947, and hearings before masters were
held almost simultaneously, May 27 in Pennsylvania, and May 28 in Florida. A final
decree of dismissal was entered in Pennsylvania on July 9, 1947, while the circuit court
in Florida granted a divorce on July 31, 1947.
5. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S; 226 (1945). See Lorenzen, The Aftermath
of Williams v. North Carolina, I MIAMI L, Q. 1 (1947).
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deniying divorce is. Until final decree is entered, the courts of Florida have
jurisdiction to entertain a multiple suit.0 This decision must be compared
with a recent one 7 holding that a decree of separate maintenance elsewhere
does not bar a suit for divorce here, because the court does not imply that an
award of separate maintenance is a denial of absolute divorce. If it were a
fact, however, that the other court had denied an absolute divorce and had
awarded separate maintenance instead, it is believed that the earlier decision
would be limited by the current one. Whether or not the decree is final, is a
question to be determined according to the law of the state where rendered.
Under the acts of Congress implementing the full faith and credit clause,
this state is not required to note judicially the law of other states. Under
Florida law, that is a question of fact to be pleaded and proved, s
Equal Protection of the Law. As a general proposition, a state may not
grant a monopoly, except in the field of public utilities, without denying
to all others the equal protection of the law guaranteed by state 1 and
federal 10 constitutions. The Supreme Court of Florida has currently taken
the position," however, that where a business may be licensed because it
would otherwise be peculiarly dangerous to the public, a lucrative monopoly
may constitutionally be granted. It upheld a recent statute which granted the
Hialeah Race Course first choice of the authorized periods for operation.
This decision is not in accord with the view usually expressed, that where
power to license exists, equal opportunity to secure a license must be open
to all.' 2 The state, however, may grant an exclusive license where the busi-
ness is one classified as a public utility or is a service which the state
might itself perform. The decision could have been rested on the basis
that operating a race course is affected with a wide public interest inas-
much as it promotes the state's important tourist industry, or because it
serves a public purpose in producing an important segment of the state's
revenue. Is this proposition so shocking that the court hesitates to state it?
6. See note 4 supra.
7. Bernstein v. Bernstein, 36 So.2d 190 (Fla. 1948). See discussion in Quarterly
Synopsis, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 333 (1948).
8. Collins v. Collins, 36 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1948), discussed in Quarterly Synopsis, p. 42,
supro. In the Gordon case, supra, note 4, the court refused the husband's motion to
dismiss but permitted him to amend his answer.
9. FLA. CONsT., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 1,
10. U.S. CONST. AMEND.. XIV, § 1.
11. Hialeah Race Course v. Gulfstream Park, 37 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1948). In 1947
the legislature provided that the track producing the most tax revenue in the preceding
year should have its choice of three periods into which the racing season was divided.
F.S.A. § 550.08. The legislative purpose, recited therein, was to protect the tax revenue
as well as the public interest. It was pointed out that one period, coming at the height
of the season, was best, and that in all probability, the track operating during that period
would always produce most tax revenue.
12. See RoTrsCHAEFFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN COYSTITUTIONAL LAW, 464 ff.
(1939). See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
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Due process of law and the "police power." The power of a state to regu-
late the activities of individuals and their enjoyment of property is conditioned
upon a showing that it does so reasonably to advance a public interest. It is
often a question of fact whether or not such a public interest exists or will be
served by a particular regulation. Where, through changes in circumstances,
the public interest will no longer be served, a regulation valid when first as-
serted may become unconstitutional. This was illustrated in a recent case'
where the court held an 1895 statute making it an offense to render fat in
cities was no longer applicable in view of technological advances making it
possible to carry on this activity without danger or annoyance.
Multiplication of taxes to the point where an undue burden is placed on the
taxpayer may be a denial of due process, according to a recent case. 14 In inter-
preting a statute to determine whether commercial fishermen must pay a
license tax levied on "wholesalers," the court noted that to construe the tax
to require this would be to pass three taxes on to the consumer: one on the
producer, one on the middleman, and one on the retailer. In a period when the
need of public revenue has justified to the courts the repeal of many of the
old limitations on the power to tax, this recognition of the ideal that the state
exists for the citizen, is indeed noteworthy.
Eminent domain. The Florida Constitution and the implementing stat-
utes'5 make payment of compensation in eminent domain proceedings a
condition precedent to taking property. It is further provided by statute,16 that
if the compensation ascertained by the jury is not paid into court within ten
days, or such further period not exceeding thirty days which the court may
allow in special cases, proceedings are null and void. The court, while an-
nouncing a rule of strict construction, ruled that this provision did not include
taxable costs; but said, as an alternative basis for its decision, that even if it
did, failure to object seasonably would estop the owner from insisting upon
literal compliance. 17
Public Property. A decision was noted 18 last Fall in which the Supreme
Court of Florida was held to have power to waive the exemption of public
lands from local taxation. A current decision19 holds that, where that has been
13. Cohen v. State ex rel McGowan, 37 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1948). In an action to
enjoin business of rendering fat in this city, the master found that, with some improve-
ments, the business could he operated with safety and without obnoxious results. The
court held that the statute (F. S. 1941, § 386.2) made this a nuisance per se and granted
an injunction. Reversed, with directions to consider the recommendations of the master.
14. Hall v. Caldwell, 37 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1948).
15. FLA. CoNsT., Art. XVI, § 29; F. S. 1941, c. 73.
16. F. S. 1941, § 73.13.
17. Inland Waterway Development Co. v. Jacksonville, 37 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1948).
18. Watson v. Caldwell, 35 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1948); noted in Synopsis, 2 Miami L, Q.
318, 319 (1948).
19. Hunt v. Everglade Drainage District, 37 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1948). Suit to quiet
title by purchaser from Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund. The Everglades
Drainage District had acquired a "Murphy-like" title for unpaid taxes.
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done, the municipal corporation cannot acquire a lien for unpaid taxes. One
who purchases from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund takes
land free of any lien for unpaid taxes, and the municipality is limited to an
action of mandamus to collect. The earlier case20 also decided that a state may
give public property to the Federal Government. This is reflected in a decision
permitting a city to transfer a hospital to the county. Any concept that public
property is held upon a public trust and that any breach of that trust is a
taking of the property of the citizens without due process of law, is rejected.
21
Retrospective Laws. The constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws
in civil cases is based in part on the due process clauses, and in part on the
requirement that no department of government exercise the powers of an-
other.22 Laws which determine the legal consequences of past events are said
to be judicial, not legislative, in character. This prohibition outlaws statutes
reviving causes of action, prosecution of which has been barred by the statute
of limitations; but according to a recent decision, where a cause of action has
not yet been barred, the period for bringing an action may be extended. 23 The
defense of the statute is thus not a property right like an accrued cause of
action 24
Rights of accused in criminal cases. The privilege against sell-incrimina-
tion, found in the state constitution, 26 extends to testimony on any material
fact which may lead to conviction, and is not limited to direct and complete
confessions of guilt. This point is emphasized in a recent case, 26 where the
Supreme Court of Florida released a witness held in contempt for refusing
to state whether or not she was a member of the Communist Party. The
prosecution urged, and the court below agreed, that since it is not a crime to
belong to the Communist Party, the answer would not tend to incriminate.
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed that members of the Communist
Party were not necessarily criminal communists; but it felt that establishment
of membership in the party coupled with other evidence, would show associ-
20. See note 18 supra.
21. Cleary v. Dade County, 37 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1948) (involving Jackson Memorial
Hospital in Miami). It should be noted, however, that in both cases the gift was to
another public agency. A gift to an individual would present a different problem. See
Howard Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) upholding federal grants to states
for administration of unemployment compensation systems.
22. FLA. CONST., Art. 1.
23. Corbett v. General Engineering & Machinery Co., 37 So.Zd 161 (Fla. 1948).
In the 1947 amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Law, it'is provided for bar
of right unless a claim is filed within two years. In this respect, the amendment changed
the period from one to two years, but was silent with respect to existing claims. The
court held that the period was extended on an existing claim not one year old when
the statute became effective.
24. But cf. Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1948), upholding statute abolishing
actions for alienation of affections; noted at p. 40, tsupra.
25. FLA. CoNsT., DECLARATION oF RIGnTs, § 12.
26. State ex reL. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1908). Habeas corpus.
The relator was sentenced, on rule nisi in contempt, for failure to answer before a grandjury.
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ation with criminal communists, who certainly must be found, if anywhere,
within the Communist Party. While a court may doubtless require the witness
to prove that giving evidence of a remote fact will tend to iiicriminate, the
connection in the present case was as obvious to the court as to the prosecution.
The opinion by Justice Terrell, who is known to us only through his writing,
and certainly not as leaning leftward, is good common sense. It will do us no
good to -save the American Way from the unworthy if in the attempt we
destroy its best features! Since criminal communism 27 is a'crime in this state,
the case probably stands on a different footing from cases arising in juris-
dictions where it is not.
The opinion also discusses loss of the privilege through grant of immunity.
A statute relied on by the prosecution was not broad enough to cover the
specific offense. Whether immunity can be granted by the legislature or by
the executive through the exercise of the power to pardon, the court has ruled
that the prosecution does not have power to confer it without statutory
authorization. If a witness has testified, relying on the promise of the prose-
cution, he will be protected on some theory of estoppel or contract; but he
cannot be compelled to enter into such an arrangement.
The privilege against self incrimination is personal. It does not prevent
the introduction of the record of another trial to prove incriminating state-
ments made by the accused on that occasion. In a trial for perjury, it is. not
a denial of the privilege against self incrimination to prove false statements
by introducing the record of a trial of the accused for larceny during the
course of which he testified.8 0
The rule making it reversible error to ask the accused when he takes the
stand whether or not he has ever been convicted of crime, rests on principles
of the law of evidence, which brand such evidence as lacking probative value.
Conviction of perjury, since it would disqualify the accused as a witness, is
an exception. Failure to object seasonably is a waiver of the right to object."'
In another case,32 arising on habeas corpus after conviction, the accused
attempted to assert his constitutional right to counsel, right to bail, and right
to summon witnesses. Since the record, which was before the court as the
result of an appeal from the conviction, disclosed that the accused had been
ably represented by 'counsel, the court found that there was no basis for
further review.
Certainly the privilege of resisting unlawful arrest is as dear to the
27. Criminal communism is a doctrine that the existing form of constitutional
government should be overthrown by force or violence or any other unlawful means.
F. S. 1941, § 876.01.
30. McKay v. State, 37 So.2d 698 (Fla. 1948).
31. Fields v. State, 37 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1948).
32. Collingsworth v. Mayo, 37 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1948).
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citizen as the special protections of the constitution. The court held,33 however,
that this privilege is lost when the person arrested is the aggressor. We have
always understood the rule to be that unlawful arrest is per se provocation.
Since the arrest was held to be lawful, however, the opinion on this point is
pure obittr dictum.
Right to trial. The accused who pleads guilty and is given a suspended
sentence is without constitutional protection if at a later date, some time
removed from the original proceeding, he is hailed before the court and sen-
tenced to confinement without an opportunity to be heard on the issue whether
or not his conduct has been good! in the meantime.84 The requirement that
there can be no revocation of probation without a hearing,35 does not apply
to suspended sentences. Arbitrary power is thus asserted by the courts to
control the subsequent behavior of the defendant, who thus trades his consti-
tutional right to trial for any future misconduct for present freedom from
punishment for a past offense; but one cannot escape the fact that the punish-
ment, when meted, is not for the original offense but for the breach of promise
to behave.
Special and local laws. All general laws of special or local application are
unconstitutional if they relate to one of the classes enumerated in Article III,
§ 20, of the Florida Constitution, according to a recent decision.86 With respect
to these subjects, laws must be general and of uniform application throughout
the state.' 7 Heretofore, these requirements have not invalidated statutes which
classified counties according to population, provided the class was "open,"
and there was a reasonable basis for classification.'8 The statute in question
gave the juvenile court in all counties now or hereafter having a population
of 180,000, jurisdiction to entertain filiation proceedings and to provide for
reasonable support. The general filiation statutes limit support orders to $50
a year. It will be observed tlat the statute is potentially applicable to every
county, and that the bastardy problem is much more acute in Dade County,
with its large, cosmopolitan population and heavy influx of tourists, than
elsewhere in the state. Justice Hobson, concurring specially, was of the opinion
that population statutes were a violation of the equal protection clauses of
state and federal constitutions; but those clauses do not prevent, as usually
construed, reasonable classification. None of the judges, however, based his
33. Fields v. State, 37 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1948).34. Pinkney v. State, 37 So.Zd 157 (Fla. 1948). The sentence was imposed two
years and seven months after the case was continued.
35. F. S. 1941, § 948.06.
36. State ex rel. York'v. Beckham, 36 So,2d 769 (Fla. 1948).
37. FLA. CONST., Art. III, § 21. It should be observed that the language of the
constitution is "throughout the state," not, as phrased by the court, "in the several counties
of Florida."
38. See Batchellor, Population Statutes under the Florida Constitution, 1 MIAMI
L. 0. 97 (1947), and (without footnotes) in FLA. B. J. (Feb. 1947).
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decision on the theory that the classification was unreasonable, and accord-
ingly more than 1500 "population" statutes are now brought into question.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Judicial review. Cases decided during this quarter
illustrate the means of securing judicial review of administrative action by
mandamus,3 9 certiorari,40 habeas corpus,41 and injunction,'2 the latter method
providing automatic review when an agency must apply to the courts to
enforce its decrees. A method of review, which appears to be novel and to
offer promise of development, is to hold a public officer entrusted with public
funds to be a trustee, accountable in equity.43 Limitations on the scope of
review were also stated. Where discretion is vested in an administrative officer,
mandamus.will not be used to direct the manner in which that discretion will
be exercised. 44 Where the administrative function is quasi legislative, the
court will determine whether or not the administrative action is within the
delegated authority.45
LICENSES. During the current quarter, it was decided 46 that where the
state has power to license a business which, because of its peculiarly dangerous
character, cannot be conducted without regulation, there is power to grant an
exclusive license. Objections to this statement of the law, based on the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, were stated above. The view
that power to license, where it exists, is plenary, belongs with the view,
repudiated in the Paoli case,'7 that a license may be revoked arbitrarily. Ex-
clusive licenses should be grantable only where the monopoly will benefit the
public, as in the case of public utilities.
The distinction between a license and a tax is made in another case.48
Although called a license tax, a levy is properly a license only if regulating
conditions must be met, or the incidence of the tax tends to regulate; but if
the license is granted on payment of the fee alone, and the business is pro-
hibited without license only as a means of enforcing payment, it is properly
39. State ex rel Kent v. Broward County, 37 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1948) (mandamus
against cqunty commissioners to compel proper assessment of taxes).
40. Orlando Transit Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 37 So.2d 312
(Fla. 1948).
41. Lane v. Williams, 37 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1948) (habeas corpus.to review conviction
under municipal ordinance).
42. Brack v. Carter, 37 So.2d 89 (Fla. 1948).
43. Scott v. Caldwell, 37 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1948). Action on deceased sheriff's bond.
44. State ex rel. Kent Corp. v. Broward County, 37 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1948) (valuation
for tax purposes by county commissioners is subject to review only for abuse of
discretion).
45. Mayo v. Rice, 37 So.2d 705 (Fla. 1948). (Commissioner of Agriculture may
not classify an artificial milk shake as a "frozen dessert.") Orlando Transit Co. v.
Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 37 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1948). (Commissioner erred
in refusing to classify a carrier's auxiliary service as "for hire.")
46. Hialeah Race Course v. Gulfstream Park, 37 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1948), sustaining
a state statute granting the track producing the most revenue in the preceding season
its choice of -periods for operation.
47. State ex eL Paoli v. Baldwin, 31 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1947), noted in 2 MIAM[ L. Q.
54 (1948), ibid. p. 318, and supra, p. 43.
48. Bateman v. Winter Park, 37 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1948).
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a tax. A statute authorizing the state beverage director to grant liquor licenses
on payment of a tax, limiting the number of licenses granted and stating
qualifications to be met by the licensee, and authorizing the municipality in
which the business is conducted to levy and collect a license tax not exceeding
halt of the state tax, is properly a licensing statute as to the state and a tax
statute as to the county. Interpreting a license tax ordinance, the court ruled 49
that a drummer who sells returned merchandise to his regular. customers as an
incident to his business, is not a "peddler" within the meaning of such an
ordinance. The distinction, which was formerly material with respect to state
taxes on interstate commerce,50 has no constitutional significance in matters
wholly interstate.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Legislative control over municipalities was
illustrated in a curious way during the quarter. The operator of a restaurant,
whose building was divided by the city-county line, was located within twenty-
five hundred feet of a school. This made it unlawful for the State Beverage
Director to issue a liquor license; but the municipal ordinance, passed pursuant
to statute, permitted sale within three hundred feet of a school. It was con-
tended, in a suit for declaratory judgment, that the legislature had granted
power to the municipality to determine policy with respect to safeguarding
schools within the area, and that grant superseded legislative power.51 Like a
statute, a municipal ordinance will not be declared invalid if there is another
ground for decision.5 2 The mayor of a city does not have authority, in the
absence of an ordinance or statutei to create additional election districts and
appoint additional inspectors."3 Usurpation of such authority will void the
election.
Authority was found in the charter of the City of Miami to transfer the
Jackson Memorial Hospital to Dade County without consideration. 5 The
effect of the "due process" clause on gifts of public property has been examined
above. In the absence of a municipal ordinance forbidding sale of liquor, a city
is without power to challenge liquor licenses issued by the State Beverage
Director in excess of statutory limitations on the number issuable."5
ELECTIONS. Where a local law is required to be submitted to the qualified
electors voting at the next general or special election in the county, submission
to the qualified voters at the Democratic and Republican primary elections is
not proper compliance. The court refused to assume that all duly qualified
49. Lane v. Williams, 37 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1948).
50. See Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919).
51. Fleeman v. Vocelle, 37 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1948). The important fact, whether the
school was in the county or in the city, is not stated in the opinion.
52. Lane v. Williams,. 37 So.2d 163 (Fla. 1948).
53. Robarts v. State ex rel. Smith, 37 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1948).
54. Cleary v. Dade County, 37 So.2d 248 (Fla. 1948). It was also contended that
the city was unlawfully delegating its duties; but it was pointed out that the duties said
to be transferred were also imposed on the county.
55. Batoman v. Winter Park, 37 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1948).
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voters were members of the one party or the other; but there was no one before
the court protesting disenfranchisement. 56 A special election may be held
concurrently with the primaries, but the formalities of a separate ballot are
constitutionally required. Where the mayor of A city has, without authority,
created an additional election district and appointed inspectors, a referendum
election is void; but failure properly to conduct an election within the time
specified in the statute will not be permitted to defeat the legislative purpose.
5 7
TAXATION. Valuations. An attempt to correct inequities believed to result
from assessing properties at less than their full market value, under which
persons entitled to a homestead exemption enjoy a larger immunity than was
intended, and persons not entitled to, or owning property valued in excess of,
the exemption, carry a disproportionate share of the cost of government, was
defeated during the quarter.5 8 Taxpayers brought mandamus to compel the
board of county commissioners to evaluate all taxable property upon its full
cash value, asserting that the tax assessor had arbitrarily assessed property
at less than a quarter of its actual cash value. Plaintiffs showed actual sales
prices to support their contention. The court ruled that current prices are not
necessarily a reflection of cash value, found that the assessor had not been
capricious or arbitrary (it was not able to review his decision on any other
basis), and approved the order denying mandamus. If an unequal distribution
of the tax burden is challenged under the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, it would seem that there should be no room for adminis-
trative discretion, but that the court must examine the facts independently to
determine whether or not there is a systematic undervaluation of property of
the same class.
Tax titles. A statute providing that municipal liens are not to be divested
by sale for county taxes, constitutes a limitation on the jurisdiction of circuit
courts according to a recent decision." The county brought an action in the
circuit court to foreclose tax liens, joiing the city. The city was served with
process, but defaulted, and a decree was entered against it. The land involved
was subsequently sold to Adams. In a suit brought by the city, in effect a
collateral attack on the judgment of the circuit court, 60 the chancellor set aside
56. State ex rel. 'Watson v. Scott, 37 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1948). Quo warranto on
relation of the attorney general to challenge members of a budget commission which
was authorized by a local law submitted for ratification. Justice Adams, dissenting, felt
that only a disenfranchised voter would have standing to complain.
57. Robarts v. State ex reL. Smith, 37 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1948).
58. State ex rel. Kent Corporation v. Broward County, 37 So.2d 253 (Fla. 1948).
59. Adams v. Leesburg, 37 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1948).
60. The court used language indicating that it was treating the grantee as a construc-
tive trustee who had acquired title by mistake, error, or by conduct failing to square
with equitable principles; and ruled that it was too late to challenge the sufficiency of the
bill. The mistake, if any, was one of law by the court, and the doctrine thus stated is
broad enough to permit collateral attack in all cases where the court has erred.
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the deed. Whatever certainty has been attained for tax titles in the past is
to this extent impaired.
This case is to be contrasted with one holding that a purchaser from the
trustees of the state Internal Improvement Fund takes free of the lien of
municipal taxes assessed against the state by consent. The municipality cannot
lien taxes against the property but must proceed by mandamus to collect. 1 It
is also to be contrasted with one liberalizing the rule that occupation by a
purchaser at tax sale, which will bar action by adverse claimants after four
years, must consist of something more than conduct of turpentine operations
thereon. 62
When liens for special improvements have been placed against land out-
side the assessing district, there is no equity in a bill to remove them. Pre-
sumably, this is because there is an adequate remedy at law. 63
CRIMINAL LAW. Inconsistent verdict.64 The rule is established in this
state that where a person is convicted upon inconsistent counts in an indict-
ment, the conviction of the lesser offense operates as an acquittal of the greater.
This occurs only when proof of guilt of one offense must necessarily disprove
guilt of the other, as where the accused is charged with breaking and entering
a building and entering the building without breaking. When this has hap-
pened, the accused is entitled to release on habeas corpus with credit for good
time." While the writ of habeas corpus may be used to correct errors made
in the trial that are jurisdictional or could not have been raised at the trial,
ordinarily matters which could have been raised by seasonable objection, are
considered as waived. In determining whether or not constitutional rights
have in fact been abridged, the supreme court may take judicial notice of the
record when it has been brought before the court on a previous appeal.60
Specific crimes. It is not a crime to belong to the Communist Party, but
membership in the Communist Party is so closely linked with criminal com-
munism that a person may, under privilege against self incrimination, refuse
to state whether or not he is a member of the party. 67 A decision was rendered
during the last quarter 68 to the effect that when an accused has been errone-
61. Hunt v. Everglades Drainage District, 37 So.2d 534 (Fla. 1948).
62. Peaden v. Estates, 36 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1948) (Apparently ditting and renewing
pulp wood plus turpentine operations may constitute possession.)
63. van Arsdall v. Winter Haven, 37 So.2d 164 (Fla. 1948).
64. Allison v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 700, 29 So.2d 751 (1947); see note 1, MIAMI L. Q.
44 (1947).
65. Tomerlin v. Mayo, 37 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1948).
66. Collingsworth v. Mayo, 37 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1948) (on application for habeas
corpus, petitioner asserted that his bond was fixed at such a high figure that he was
unable to secure freedom to obtain evidence and consult counsel before trial; and that
he was not represented by counsel at trial. Errors during trial were also charged. The
court consulted the record, found that accused had been ably represented by counsel, and
denied the writ.)
67. State ex rel. Benemovsky v. Sullivan, 37 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1948).
68. State v. Nelson, 36 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1948). See Synopsis at pp. 41 and 48, supra.
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ously convicted as a fourth offender and released on habeas corpus, the trial
court may retain jurisdiction and sentence him as a second offender, nunc pro
tunc. This was followed by a current decision holding that it is error to quash
the information and vacate the sentence in such circumstances. 6 19 Since the
fourth offense statute is construed, to avoid constitutional limitations, as in-
creasing the punishment for the latest offense rather than as constituting a
separate offense, an information is not fatally defective if it discloses that more
than one offense has been committed.
A peace officer is empowered to arrest without warrant where there is
reasonable ground to believe that a felony has been committed and that the
person arrested has committed it. In this respect, he has an advantage over
the private citizen, who may arrest without warrant on reasonable suspicion
only if a felony has actually been committed. But whether or not an arrest is
lawful, an unprovoked assault upon an officer constitutes assault and battery.70
PRIVATE LAW
REAL PROPERTY. Public easements. At common law, an action of eject-
ment could be maintained only by one entitled to possession. The owner of
land subject to an easement could bring ejectment; but the owner of an ease-
ment was required to sue in case for damages or to bring a bill in equity.
Whether or not this rule persists in Florida, was brought into question during
the last quarter when a county brought a bill in equity against the owner of
land subject to the easement of a county road, who removed a cattle gap and
replaced it with a barrier. 1 Reversing the trial court, the -Supreme Court found
equity in the bill; not for the historical reason, but rather because the remedy
in equity was more complete. While ownership of bay bottom may be subject
to a public easement of navigation, and the owner may not fill his land without
a license, it has nevertheless been held that he may maintain a bill in equity
against an adjoining owner who, in filling his land, places fill upon plaintiff's,72
The case is an interesting complement to the preceding one, and to a case
where the subjacent owner sued a member of the public for excessive uses of
the easement, noted recently. 72
Covenants running with the land. The liberal attitude of the Florida
Supreme Court in the construction and enforcement of covenants running with
-the land, which was noted last quarter, 74 persists. From a dissenting opinion
filed,-one may infer that grantees of a common grantor, purchasing lots in a
69. State v. Bell, 37 So.2d 95 (Fla. 1948).
70. Fields v. State, 36 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1948).
71. Citrus County v. Love, 37 So,2d 834 (1948).
72. Hanna v. Martin, 37 So.2d 579 (Fla. 1948).
73. Morrison Cafeteria Co. v. Shamhart, 35 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1948); see Synopsis,
2 MIAMI L. Q. 330 (1948).
74. See Synopsis, p. 46, supro.
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development subject to restrictions against commercial building, may enforce
the restrictions by action one against the other.?5 It may be inferred that this
is true even if the common grantor did not own all the lots in the development,
the lots were not contiguous, and proof failed that the restrictions were part
of a general scheme of development adopted by all the owners of lots in the
area. Again inferring the opinion of the court from the dissent, the facts that
the defendant's lot adjoins unrestricted land, or that a zoning ordinance permits
commercial building, have no influence on the result if the dominant tenement
will be benefitted by enforcing the restriction. Such a view encourages sound
community development and assures property values.
Caveat emptor. There is no implied warranty in a contract to sell land
that the buildings thereon are free of termites. In a recent case,76 the purchaser,
having taken possession of a house under a contract for sale, sought to rescind
because the house was infested with termites. The contract contained no spe-
cific provision on this point. The seller did not deny representing that there
were no termites, but insisted that he was right and exhibited an exterminator's
guarantee. The decision, upholding a decree for the seller, shows that there
is no implied warranty in a sale of land that it is fit to be used for the purposes
for which it is sold. During the last quarter, the court departed from this view
in a case involving a lease, which we noted as being out of line.7"
Brokers. A real estate broker who has secured the purchaser's signature
to a valid contract of sale is not entitled to his commission until the sale has
been closed. When a contract for the sale of land is reduced to writing and
executed, the sale is complete in equity: both buyer and seller may sue for
specific performance, and the risk of loss, unless otherwise specified, passes
to the purchaser. It would therefore seem that once the seller has an enforceable
contract, the broker has earned his commission; but the court has held 78 that
the broker's commission is not an element of damages to be recovered if the
seller elects not to sue for specific performance but for damages. It is also
held, that while the seller may have a security interest in hand money paid
by the purchaser, he does not have a right to sue for the agreed hand money,
as liquidated damages, when the purchaser defaults before depositing the
hand money.
A broker with whom real property has been listed for sale, does not have
implied authority to execute a contract of sale for the seller. In a current
case, 79 a broker had obtained a purchaser willing and able to purchase on the
75. Wheeler v. Lautz, 36 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1948).
76. Medard v. Paulson, 37 So.2d 902 (Fla. 1948).
77. Marks v. Fields, 36 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1948) ; see Synopsis, p. 45, supra.
78. Pembroke v. Caudill, 37 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1948).
79. Dwiggins v. Roth, 37 So.2d 702 (Eta. 1948). The broker signed the contract
and delivered possession. Seller brought a. bill in equity to declare the contract invalid,
and to recover possession.
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seller's terms, but the seller arbitrarily withdrew before the contract was
executed. In such circumstances, the seller would be liable to the broker for
commission, 0 but the purchaser can acquire no rights in equity to the posses-
sion of the land until the contract has been signed. Where the purchaser makes
a counter offer, and gives a check payable to the broker for hand money, the
broker ceases to act as agent for the seller and becomes agent for the purchaser,
according to another case.81
CONTRACTS AND COMMERCIAL LAW. Following the usual line of authority,
it was held 62 that a dealer who has taken goods on consignment for sale, does
not have power to mortgage such property. There is no fraud, actual or con-
structive, on creditors, this being an established custom of business. A pur-
chaser from the dealer may acquire a good title, but a creditor can acquire no
rights superior to the owner's, and a person taking a mortgage of such property
cannot complain if he did not make inquiry. The mortgagee in this case took
a "floor plan chattel mortgage" on numerous automobiles on a used car lot.
Inspection of the individual title certificates would have disclosed the true
owner.
EQUITY. Constructive trusts. A decision88 holding a public officer under
a statutory duty to receive and account for public funds, to be a trustee, ac-
countable in equity, has been noted above for its administrative law implica-
tions. More adequate remedy in equity. The maxim that a bill will not be
dismissed for want of equity when the equitable remedy is more complete
than the legal one, is exemplified in a recent case 4 where the equitable remedy
of enjoining interference with a public way was held to be more complete
than an action at law, presumably ejectment. The case is discussed above
under Real Property. Other cases decided in equity, where the problem of
forum was not the primary one, are discussed elsewhere in this note.
FAMILY LAW. Custody of children. In two cases involving the custody
of children, the court has indicated a disposition to treat the interest of the
child as of primary concern, departing from the view, formerly held, that
custody was a right of the parents, to be awarded as an element of damages
in divorce cases.85 The old view, that the husband is presumptively entitled
to custody, has been branded as obsolete.86 Where a child is sufficiently ma-
ture to express a preference, the court may consider that preference in deter-
80. Perper v. Edell, 35 So2d 387 (Fla. 1948) ; Synopsis, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 322 (1948).
81. Lohmeyer v. Williams, 37 So2d 419 (Fla. 1948).
82. Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Bandel, 37 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1948).
83. Scott v. Caldwell, 37 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1948).
84. Citrus County v. Love, 37 So.2d 834 (Fla. 1948).
85. See Leo M. and Louise A. Alpert, Custody Incident to Divorce in Florida, 2
MIAMI L. Q. 31 (1948).
86. Smith v. Smith, 36 So.2d 920 (Fla. 1948).
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mining the question. 7 A custody decree is not final, and may be modified by
any court which obtains jurisdiction over the child.88
Divorce. A decree of divorce is a final adjudication of the property rights
of the parties, if settlement of those rights has been submitted to the court.
After a final decree, this is res adjudicata, even if the decree in terms purports
to retain jurisdiction of the case.8 9 Where the wife, suing for divorce, is found
by the chancellor to have been guilty of indiscreet conduct, his decree dis-
missing the bill based upon that finding will be reversed.9 0 Proof of indiscreet
conduct falls short of proving adultery. The discretion customarily accorded
the chancellor does not permit him to dismiss a suit for divorce on this ground.
Married women's property. A married woman's contract to sell land
executed prior to May 27, 1947,91 must be acknowledged to be effective.
Where there has been such partial performance as to make a parole contract
to convey land enforceable in equity, 92 specific performance may be awarded
against a married woman. A further parallel between an unwritten contract to
convey and an unacknowledged married woman's contract is found in a cur-
rent case. A married woman, in a conveyance duly acknowledged and recorded,
referred to a prior unacknowledged contract. The court held that this cured
the defect in the prior contract. 93
TORTS. Malicious prosecution. During the quarter, the Supreme Court
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff, finding the evidence legally sufficient to
prove malice and want of probable cause. The case 94 would doubtless have
furnished a valuable precedent if the court had stated, in a few sentences,
what evidence was presented. Statutory standards of conduct. Two decisions
illustrate the weight to be accorded statutes in determining standards of con-
duct in tort cases. The statute in one made it an offense to render fat in a
city; the other, to park a vehicle on the highway with all four wheels on the
pavement. In each case, it was ruled that the statute did not create tort liability
per se; the court in the first cas 95 denying a hill to enjoin conduct of a fat
and grease reclaiming business where it was shown that it could be conducted
innocuously; and in the second,96 sustaining a demurrer to a complaint for
87. Eddy v. Stauffer, 37 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1948).
88. Supra.
89. Finston v. Finston, 37 So.2d 423 (Fla. 1948).
90. Saliba v. Saliba, 37 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1948). (The chancellor's finding was based
upon an independent inquiry, not raised by the pleadings.)
91. Changed by Ch. 23820, Laws of 1947; F.S.A. § 693.03. For history of this
statute, see Flowers, Real Property Laws of 1947, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 21 (1947) ; see Comment,
Married Women's Acknowled4ements in Florida, 1 MIAMI L. Q. 37 (1947).
92. See Synopsis, 2 MIAMI L. Q, 323 (1948).
93. Baker v. Rice, 37 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1948). (The case might have been decided
upon the rule pf part performance, the purchasers having entered and erected a house
on the property.)
94. Gainesville Gas Co. v. Waiters, 37 So.2d 695 (Fla. 1948).
95. Cohen v. State ex rel. McGowan, 37 So.2d 700 (Fla. 1948).
96. Bond v. Palm Beach Landscape Co., 37 So2d 536 (Fla. 1948).
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negligently causing an accident, in which no other facts were alleged. In the
latter case, there was a dissent on the basis that enough was alleged to take
the case, if supported by evidence, to the jury.
A decision noted 07 last quarter, in which the court defined the duty of
care owed by the driver of a motor vehicle in crossing railway tracks, was
amplified during the present quarter. Where the view is so obstructed that
the train cannot otherwise be seen, it is the duty of the driver of a vehicle to
stop, look and listen before crossing.9 Since contributory negligence is not a
defense in actions against railroad companies, 9" it is not necessary for the
court to remand the case if the plaintiff consents to remit part of the judgment.
DAMAGES. Tort cases. As noted above, in actions against railroad com-
panies for negligently causing injury to person' or property, contributory
negligence is not a defense, but matter to be considered in mitigation of dam-
ages.10 0 It is further apparent, that conditions of inflation in the field of
damages will continue to plague the big, bad utilities: The court would not
consider a verdict of $7,750 excessive where the plaintiff, who sustained in-
juries to one leg "twelve per cent permanent" and was incapacitated for
thirteen months, was sixty years of age, earned $80 per month, and was, as
a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence. The appellate court granted
a remittitur based on this fin4ing, a procedure rarely used in this country.
When a remittitur is granted by a trial court, the defendant may appeal if the
amended verdict is excessive. If the procedure has otherwise been without
error, the defendant has actually suffered a verdict for a larger amount, and
is in no position to complain of minor inequities. When, however, the court
grants a remittitur after finding not only that the damages are excessive but
also that the jury has failed to consider an important element in mitigation,
it is in effect depriving the defendant of his right to trial by jury.
Contract Cases. As noted above, a broker's commission is not an element
of damages in an action for breach of contract ta convey land.101 Whether
this means that the broker -is not entitled to his commission if the seller treats
the contract as rescinded and sues for damages, or that the seller's liability
to the broker is one that cannot be charged to the buyer, and is in this respect
like a litigant's counsel fees, the problem will remain the subject of speculation.
A litigant's attorney's fees are an element of damages in eminent domain
proceedings ;102 but fees paid to an attorney for taking depositions may not
be taxed as cost.103
97. Atlantic Coast Line'v. Timmons, 36 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1948) ; see Synopsis, p. 44,
supra.
98. Seaboard Air Line v. Boles, 37 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1948).
99. F. S. 1941, § 768.06.
100. Seaboard Air Line v. Boles, 37 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1948).
101. Pembroke v. Caudill, 37 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1948).
102. Inland Waterway Development Co. v. Jacksonville, 37 So2d 333 (Fla. 1948).
103. Dorner v. Red Top Cab & Baggage Co., 37 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1948).
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Liquidated damages. A contract to pay liquidated damages is regarded as
a contract for a penalty unless there are satisfied two requisities: first, the
damages which the parties contemplate would otherwise be difficult to ascer-
tain; and second, the stipulated amount must bear some fair relationship to
the actual damages which would result from a breach. This rule was applied 104
in the case of the more or less customary agreement to deposit ten per cent
of the purchase price in an agreement to purchase land, the court finding that
the measure of damages for breach in such cases is one clearly defined by
law, and hence not difficult to ascertain. In this case, the purchaser stopped
payment on his check for "hand money" and the seller sued to recover that
amount. The converse of this ruling would be that a defaulting buyer has an
action to recover the hand money paid to the seller where the seller sells, or
could sell, the property for the contract price, the broker's commission being
unearned in such a case.
ADJECTIVAL LAW
EVIDENCE. Presumptions. The confusing subject of presumptions and
their effect as evidence, received attention. It is usually said that presumptions
are not evidence, but establish the burden of proof on particular issues. Fol-
lowing a view expounded by Thayer, the court has held that a presumption
takes the place of evidence only until credible evidence is introduced, when
it vanishes.105 The presumption of agency from proof of ownership of an
automobile truck involved in an accident, does not have any existence in a
case where the uncontradicted evidence showed that the owner did not con-
sent to use of the vehicle. On such a record, it was not error to take the case
from the jury.
Judicial records. The record of eviderce given in a prosecution for larceny
may be introduced in a subsequent prosecution for perjury committed at the
prior trial. 10 3 This does hot constitute a true exception to the hearsay rule,
the record being offered to show that the statements were made in court
under oath, and not for the truth or falsity of the testimony. Evidence of prior
convictions of any crime except perjury may not be introduced against the
accused, not because of any constitutional protection, but because such evi-
dence has no probative value and is highly prejudicial. If objection is not
seasonably made, however, there will be no reversal for admission of such
testimony. 07
Public records. A certified copy of an audit report made by a certified
public accountant employed as assistant state auditor is admissible in evidence
104. Pembioke v. Caudill, 37 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1948).
105. Johnson v. Mills, 37 So.2d 906 (Fla. 1948.
106. McKay v. State, 37 So.2d 698 (Fla. 124.
107. Fields v. State, 36 So2d 919 (Fla. 1948).
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in an action on a sheriff's bond to prove shortages.10 8 The court treated the
report as a public record, and held it admissible. There should have been no
real problem here, because the auditor who made the examination was present
in court and testified. It also held that the statement of an accountant sum-
marizing his examination of books, is admissible as expert testimony.
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. Res adjudicata. Parties cannot attack col-
laterally a judgment. rendered in a lawsuit in which both have appeared before
a court of competent jurisdiction. 0 9 This rule becomes one of constitutional
limitation by reason of the full faith and credit clause when state lines have
been crossed." 0 It does not apply where a court of limited jurisdiction exceeds
its authority;"' but generally, it applies where the court is one of general
jurisdiction. In the past, the writ of prohibition has been used to test the
jurisdiction of a court, 1 2 but it is apparent from three cases arising during the
quarter, that its function has been misconceived."" The writ does not lie to
review a judgment when the time for appeal has passed, or to acquire juris-
diction while a court of competent jurisdiction is considering a case. In one
case, where a court of general jurisdiction had awarded foreclosure of a tax
lien against a municipal corporation served with process, the court permitted
a collateral attack, taking a view of the case which we believe to be wrong.14
Attorneys. The principle that attorneys' fees may not, as a general rule,
be taxed as costs, extends to fees paid attorneys at distant points for taking
depositions."15 Other costs incurred in taking depositions which are not used
at trial may not be taxed under the same principle."1
Judges. There is a legendary case in which the British Court of Appeals
said: "This is an appeal from a decision of Mr. Justice Kekewich, but we have
other reasons for reversing." A curious parallel, possibly reflecting last Fall's
elections, is found 117 in a current case, where the court, whether from malice
or oversight, or from a conviction that the circuit judge was lacking in im-
partiality, described the case below as one in which the circuit judge joined
as plaintiff.
PRACTICE. Several decisions, largely unrelated, dealing with matters of
procedure, are discussed in this section. Ne exeat bond. A ne exeat bond
issued to insure presence of the defendant in court when final judgment is
108. Scott v. Caldwell, 37 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1948).
109. Finston v. Finston, 37 So2d 423 (Fla. 1948).
110. Gordon v. Gordon, 36 So.d 774 (Fla. 1948).
111. State ex tl York v. Beckham, 36 So.2d 769 (Fla. 1948).
112. Supra
113. White v. State ex rel. Johnson, 37 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1948) ; State ex reL Reynolds
Construction Co. v. Hendry, 37 So.2d 904 (Fla. 1948) ; State ex tL Johnson v. Anderson,
37 So.2d 910 (Fla. 1948). This is also true of habeas corpus: Collingsworth v. Mayo,
37 So.2d 696 (Fla. 1948).
114. Adams v. Leesburg, 37 So.2d 706 (Fla. 1948).
115. Dorner v. Red Top Cab & Baggage Co., 37 So.2d 160 (Fla. 1948).
116. Supra.
117. Lohmeyer v. Williams, 37 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1948).
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entered is in effect an appearance bond, and once judgment has been entered,
defendant appearing, the surety is discharged. 1 s Writ of error coram nobis.
A writ of error coram nobis is issued by the Supreme Court only when the
case has been brought before it on appeal; otherwise the writ is granted by
the trial court. 1 9 Leave to intervene in Supreme Court. No intervention will
be allowed in the Supreme Court, unless in an original proceeding. A writ of
certiorari to an administration agency is an original proceeding, but not such
a one as to admit intervention. 120
Scope of appeal. Where a case has proceeded to trial after a motion to
dismiss has been refused, the sufficiency of the bill cannot be raised on appeal.
In condemnation proceedings, the issue of public necessity is a question of
law, and is properly raised on motion to dismiss. After the case has proceeded
to trial, it cannot be raised on appeal from an order granting a new trial. 121
Time for appeal. When a court enters a final decree but retains jurisdiction
to tax costs, and a petition for rehearing is filed promptly, neither the fact that
jurisdiction was retained to tax costs or the fact that a petition for rehearing
was filed, will prevent the running of the period during which an appeal must
be taken. 122
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118. Buonanno v. Caldwell, 37 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1948).
119. Durley v. Mayo, 37 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1948).
120. Orlando Transit Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission, 37 So.2d 321
(Fla. 1948).
121. Edwards v. Miami Shores, 37 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1948).
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